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Punitive Damages, the Common
Question Class Action, and the
Concept of Overkill
The assessment of punitive damages has been difficult to reconcile
with the imposition of mass civil liability.' For instance, the relation-
ship between punitive damages and the common question class action
device has yet to be considered by the courts.' In some circumstances,
the societal purposes which the class action device serves are remarka-
bly similar to those which punitive damages are designed to serve. This
redundancy may result in overkill3 when punitive damages are assessed
in a class action.
The most logical and frequently stated rationales for awarding puni-
tive damages are: (1) to provide a plaintiff who has suffered only nom-
inal damages with an incentive to litigate;4 (2) to punish the defendant
for the transgression;5 and (3) to deter the defendant and others from
committing similar acts in the future.' These rationales were devel-
oped almost entirely in single plaintiff actions.7 With the advent of
1. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967); Note,
Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HAST. L.J. 1797, 1798 (1979). "Mass civil liabil-
ity" refers to the situation in which a single defendant incurs compensatory liability to a large
number of plaintiffs.
2. See, for example, Wilson v. Bank of 4merica, No. 643,872, proposed statement of decision
(Super. Ct. San Francisco, 1982) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
proposed statement of decision], in which the court awarded the plaintiff class in excess of 101
mIlion dollars without considering the relationship between punitive damages and the class ac-
tion device. See also The Sacramento Bee, Jan. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
The issue of whether the class action device is an effective instrument for handling mass tort
punitive damage cases is slated for consideration by both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeal. See The National Law Journal, March 15, 1982, at 2, col. 2. The issue of the propriety of
awarding punitive damages in class actions has become all the more important since, in the case to
be reviewed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court found that the class action
device was an appropriate method for protecting the defendant from multiple awards of punitive
damages. See In Re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
898-900 (N.D. Cal. 1981). If this rationale is followed by other courts, it may result in more
punitive damage cases being tried as class actions.
3. "Overkill" refers to the situation in which the total award of compensatory damages is
much larger than what would be necessary to fulfill the societal purposes traditionally served by
an award of punitive damages. See generally note 1 supra.
4. See notes 42-57 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 58-79 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 58-79 and accompanying text infra.
7. See generally note I supra.
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modem permissive joinder rules' and the increased use of the class ac-
tion device, punitive damages have continued to be awarded without a
thorough consideration of their relationship to mass liability.9 Simi-
larly, the purposes of the common question class action are in need of
reconsideration.
Despite claims that the common quest.ion class action was intended
to "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,"' 0 and facilitate
compensation of individual plaintiffs," it has failed to meet these
objectives. 2 The common question class action does, however, per-
form an important role in our judicial system by providing plaintiffs
who have only small individual claims with an incentive to seek judi-
cial redress,' 3 and by deterring defendants, and others like them, from
engaging in antisocial behavior in the future. 1
4
This comment will examine the validity of the assessment of punitive
damages in selected types of common question class actions' 5 and will
discern under what circumstances an award of punitive damages
should not be made. First, the comment will briefly examine the his-
tory of punitive damages and the societal purposes for which they are
awarded. 6 A discussion of the purposes that the common question
class action was designed to fulfill will follow. 7 After concluding that
these goals of the class action have not been reached, the comment will
discuss the societal purposes that the class action device actually ful-
fills.' 8 Furthermore, the substantial punitive effects that a class action
8. See, eg., FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a), 20, 21; CAL. CiV. CODE §§1780, 1781; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§379, 382.
9. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1967). This was
one of the first cases to consider the relationship between punitive damages and mass liability.
10. See FED. K. CwV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee note.
11. See notes 103-104 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 101-121 and accompanying text infra.
13. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
14. See Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 CaL Rptr. 796,
800 (1971).
15. The comment will be limited to an analysis of the Rule 23(b)(3) type of class action.
Unless otherwise noted, all references to class actions will be of this type. Rule 23(b)(3) provides
that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition: (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and effi-
dent adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
16. See notes 22-79 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 101-121 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 122-199 and accompanying text infra.
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may have upon a defendant will be explored.19 The comment will con-
clude that when the societal purposes traditionally served by "awarding
punitive damages are adequately fulfilled by the class action device it-
self, punitive damages are an unnecessary and unwarranted measure,
and should not be awarded.20 Three factors will be suggested that if
present, will show that the purposes of punitive damages are suffi-
ciently served by the class action device.21 To begin this inquiry, the
history and purposes of punitive damages must briefly be reviewed.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory22 ,or nomi-
nal damages,' awarded against a defendant to further some societal
purpose.24 The purposes for which punitive damages have been
awarded have not always remained static. Different jurisdictions have
used widely disparate rationales to justify an award over and above
what was required to compensate the plaintiff for his injury.25 To de-
termine whether the societal purposes of punitive damages can be ade-
quately served by the class action device, the purposes for which an
award of punitive damages is made must be specifically identified.
The practice of awarding punitive damages originated in the com-
mon law of England.26 Despite the fact that the use of punitive dam-
ages has been severely restricted in England,27 they were readily
19. See notes 200-225 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 226-228 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 226-228 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Wade v. Power Co., 51 S.C. 296, 299,29 S.E. 233, 236 (1898) (defining compensatory
damages as "such compensation as will make [the plaintiff] whole,-pay for the actual loss they
have sustained...").
23. See Seelig v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 287 Mo. 343, 350, 230 S.W. 94, 102 (1921)
(defining nominal damages as "a trifling sum awarded where a breach of duty or an infraction of
the plaintiffs right is shown, but no serious loss is proved to have been sustained.").
24. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (the societal purposes identified in
the Restatement are punishment and deterrence). See generally Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 Harv. L. REv. 1173 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
25. See generally Beri, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use dnd Their Worth in Pres-
ent-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Belli].
26. In Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763), the first case to specifically discuss "exem-
plary' damages, the plaintiff brought an action for trespass after the defendant and the King's
messengers ransacked his house because of a libelous pamphlet which he had published. Id. at
489. The jury awarded one thousand pounds to the plaintiff. Id. at 499. The jury deliberated for
"near half an hour prior to bringing in the verdict.' Id. One factor which may have hastened
their decision was that the trial began at nine in the morning, and the jury was not sent out until
about ten-fifty p.m. See id. In reviewing this award, Lord Chief Justice Pratt said:
[A] jury have [sic] it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received.
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such preceeding for the future, and as a proof
of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.
Id. at 498-99. Accord Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
27. See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E.R. 367, 410-11. The assessment of punitive dam-
ages is limited to cases involving oppressive conduct by servants of the government and situations
1275
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adopted in the United States28 where they continue to flourish. 9 Puni-
tive damages generally are awarded only when the plaintiff's injury is
caused by extreme or exceptional conduct of the defendant 30 and is
accompanied by aggravating circumstances such as oppression,31 mal-
ice,32 fraud, 3  wantonness, willfulness, or gross negligence. 4  In most
jurisdictions, a plaintiff must prove actual, damages or a basis for recov-
ery of nominal damages as a prerequisite to an award of punitive dam-
ages. 35 The amount of punitive damages awarded is usually required
to bear a reasonable relationship to the plaintiff's actual damages.36
There is no fixed ratio between punitive and actual damages, however,
for determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.37
The currently predominant rationales38 for awarding punitive dam-
when the defendant has persevered in wrongful conduct because it is likely to profit him in excess
of any potential compensatory liability. See id.
28. See generally Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
29. See Belli, supra note 25, at I (and cases cited therein).
30. See Sears v. Holly, 113 Ohio App. 349, 351, 178 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1960).
31. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(c)(2) (defining oppression as "subjecting a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.").
32. See id. §3294(c)(1) (defining malice as "conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.").
33. See id. §3294(c)(3) (defining fraud as "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or con-
cealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant
of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.").
34. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
35. See Contractor's Safety Ass'n v. California Compensation Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 77, 307
P.2d 626, 629 (1957).
36. See Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481,496, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140
(1976). See generally Belli, supra note 25, at 11-12; Comment, Punitive Damages and the Reason-
able Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of urpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823 (1978).
37. See Finney v. Lockhart, 35 Cal. 2d 161, 163, 217 P.2d 19, 21 (1950). See generally Com-
ment, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration oPurpose, 9
PAc. L.J. 823 (1978).
38. Punitive damages have been referred to by a variety of names, some of which are indica-
tive of the purpose for which the award was made. The term "punitive damages" reflects the
retributive rationale of these awards, while "exemplary damages" denotes their deterrent function.
The term "vindictive damages" refers to an early justification for requiring the defendant to pay
an amount in excess of the actual damages of the plaintiff. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW,
39-40 (1881). These awards were made to quell the plaintiffs desire for extrajudicial revenge. See
id. The idea was to keep the plaintiff from taking the law into his own hands. See Id.
Some jurisdictions have awarded punitive damages with the purpose of compensating the plain-
tiff. See, eg., Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934); Kilgore v. National Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 280, 138 S.E.2d 397 (1964); Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177
N.W. 65 (1920). The validity of a compensatory purpose is somewhat dubious since, in most
jurisdictions, this is the purpose of actual damages. See Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled
Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 873-74 (1976). A compensatory rationale for awarding punitive
damages could conceivably result in double recovery. See id. One possible explanation for this
rationale is that it allows plaintiffs to be reimbursed for expenses, such as attorneys' fees, not
otherwise recoverable as compensatory damages. See id. This rationale is evident in jurisdictions
that limit the amount recoverable as punitive damages to the cost of the litigation. See generally
Craney v. Conovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917). California has expressly rejected this ration-
ale. See Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 801-02, 197 P.2d 713,
720 (1948). Punitive damages have also been considered compensatory on the theory that when
circumstances are present that would warrant an award of punitive damages, such as malice or
1276
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ages are: (1) to serve the interests of public justice by providing the
plaintiff with an incentive to bring the action;39 (2) to punish the
wrongdoing defendant;4" and (3) to deter the wrongdoer, and others as
well, from engaging in the proscribed conduct.41 A closer examination
of these rationales is necessary prior to comparing them with the pur-
poses of certain common question class actions.
-4. Incentive42
Under the incentive rationale, the possibility of an award of punitive
damages serves to promote the public policy of encouraging plaintiffs
to assert their rights.43 This is particularly true when the injury to the
plaintiff is not adequately compensable in actual damages, yet consti-
tutes a substantial invasion of the individual's rights.44 In this situa-
tion, a non-compensable injury, or one which warrants only a relatively
small recovery, might render litigation economically impracticable.
45
The defendant's conduct, however, may be sufficiently reprehensible to
warrant some type of judicial sanction.46 Although societal redress is
sometimes available through the criminal justice system, this type of
behavior is frequently overlooked by overburdened prosecutors.47 In
addition, the complaining witness may not feel it is worth his while to
endure the inconveniences of a criminal prosecution when he stands to
gain no monetary benefit. Often, if the defendant is to be disciplined at
all, it must take place in the civil courts. The possibility of an award of
punitive damages allows the plaintiff to act in the capacity of a private
attorney general, ensuring that anti-social conduct is appropriately
fraud, the plaintiff's injury is aggravated. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 9 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Thus a larger award is required to adequately compensate
him. See PROSSER, supra, at 9. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
39. See Belli, supra note 25, at 5-6.
40. See Gudarov v. Hadjieff, 38 Cal. 2d 412, 417, 240 P.2d 621, 623 (1952).
41. See id.
42. The incentive rationale for awarding punitive damages has become so ingrained into the
law that courts seldom bother to articulate it. The rationale is observable, however, in many of
the rules regarding punitive damages. For instance, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages in
an action when only nominal compensatory damages have been awarded. See Muller v. Reagh,
150 Cal. App. 2d 99, 101, 309 P.2d 826, 827 (1957). In this situation, the possibility of being
awarded punitive damages acts as an incentive to the plaintiff to litigate, thus bringing the
defendant before the court where the punitive and deterrent rationales may be effectuated.
43. See Belli, supra note 25, at 6.
44. See Belli, supra note 25, at 6. An analogous purpose is found in those statutes that au-
thorize treble damages for violations of certain rights. See 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976); see also Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); D. GOULD, STAFF REPORT ON THE CONSUMER
CLASS ACTiON, Submitted to the National Institute for Consumer Justice 19 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as GOULD]; PROSSER, supra note 38, at 11. In bringing an action under a treble damage
provision the plaintiff is said to act as a private attorney general. See 405 U.S. at 262; GOULD,
supra at 19.
45. See Belli, supra note 25, at 6. One example of this type of behavior is the tort of assault.
46. See Belli, supra note 25, at 6.
47. See C. McCoRMIcic, LAW OF DAMAGES §77, at 276-77 (1935).
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punished.48
The facts of Huckle v. Money,49 a landmark English case in which
punitive damages were awarded, are illustrative of a situation in which
punitive damages may act as an incentive to a plaintiff to seek judicial
redress. The plaintiff, a journeyman printer, was taken into custody by
one of the King's messengers because he was suspected of publishing
The North Briton, an allegedly seditious publication." The plaintiff
was held wrongfully for six hours but was treated "very civilly. . . so
that he suffered very little or no damages . . . ,"I Fourteen other
plaintiffs had previously brought suits against messengers for similar
acts and each had recovered a verdict for two hundred pounds.-2 Al-
though the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff were estimated to
be only twenty pounds,53 the jury awarded him three hundred
pounds. 4 The court upheld the award despite the defendant's claim
that it was excessive.5 The court based this holding, in part, upon the
fact that the act of the messenger was a "daring public attack made
upon the liberty of the subject. . ." and was in violation of the Magna
Charta.56  There can be little doubt that the possibility of being
awarded punitive damages in an amount fifteen times greater than his
actual damages served as an incentive to the plaintiff to seek judicial
redress for this attempt "to destroy the liberty of the kingdom."57 The
possibility of an award of punitive damages gave the plaintiff an incen-
tive to seek judicial redress for minor or noncompensable violations of
his rights, thus bringing the defendant before the court where the other
societal purposes of punishment and deterrence could be served.
B. Punishment and Deterrence
In addition to providing the plaintiff with an incentive to bring his
cause of action, punitive damages are also awarded to further the socie-
48. But see Morris, supra note 24, at 1183.
49. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 769. Thirteen of the actions were settled out of court after two were tried.
53. Id. at 768.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 769.
57. Id. The incentive rationale is the only one that justifies allowing the plaintiff to keep the
amount of punitive damages awarded. Cf. Morris, supra note 24, at 1176. Under a strictly retrib-
utive or deterrent rationale, the award would more properly be given to the government since it is
the function of the government to punish and deter wrongdoers. Cf. Morris, supra note 24, at
1176. In fact, allowing the plaintiff to keep the award has been criticized as opening the door to
"inadvisedly severe admonition." See Morris, supra note 24, at 1176-83. As far as the plaintiff is
concerned, an award of punitive damages is essentially a windfall. See Morris, supra note 24, at
1177 n.7. He has done nothing to earn it other than being the victim of exceptionally abominable
conduct.
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tal purposes of punishment and deterrence." These two concepts are
inextricably related, consideration of one leading naturally to the
other.5 9 Society punishes the individual defendant by extracting from
him monies in excess of what is required to compensate the plaintiff.
60
Concurrently, the forced payment of punitive damages furthers the so-
cietal interest of deterring the defendant and others from engaging in
the same socially unacceptable conduct.6
The retributive and deterrent rationales for awarding punitive dam-
ages are readily observable in many of the rules governing these
awards. As a general rule, the wealth of the defendant is one factor
which may be considered in setting the amount of punitive damages. 2
Unlike the penal system, in which a certain period of time spent incar-
cerated will punish all persons more or less equally, one sum of money
may financially ruin one defendant while constituting only a slight an-
noyance to another.63 Knowledge of the wealth of the defendant is
therefore necessary to ensure that the award is neither overly punitive
nor impotent in effect.64
Most jurisdictions do not allow a defendant to insure against the pos-
sibility of an award of punitive damages. 65 This rule precludes a cor-
porate defendant, for example, from avoiding a punitive damages
award and passing the cost of the insurance on to the public in the form
of higher prices.66 The defendant must feel financial pain to be pun-
ished.67 Similarly, others will not be deterred from committing antiso-
cial conduct if they know that punitive liability will fall upon an
insurer. The rule that punitive damages may not be recovered if the
wrongdoer dies prior to the making of the award is also based on a
punitive rationale.6 8 To be punished, one must be cognizant of the
58. California has expressly adopted this rationale. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(a) which
states that "the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant;" see also Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d
910, 929, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978); Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 489-90,
31 P.2d 389, 390 (1934); Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 3d 821, 835, 161
Cal. Rptr. 225, 233 (1979).
59. A detailed analysis of the concepts of punishment and deterrence and their interrelation-
ships is beyond the scope of this comment. For an excellent discussion of this subject, see A.
VoNHRSCH, DoING JusTIcE, THE CHOICE OF PuNIsHmEms 45-55 (1976).
60. See generally Day v. Woodworth, 45 U.S. (13 How.) 534, 536 (1851).
61. See 25 CJ.S. Damages §117(1).
62. See Weisenburg v. Molina, 58 Cal. App. 3d 478, 490, 129 Cal. Rptr. 813, 820 (1976).
63. Cf. Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 65, 529 P.2d 608, 624, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184, 200 (1974) (the court noted that "[t]he vast wealths of the defendants warrant a large award
64. Id.
65. See generally Note, An Overview of the Insurability of Punitive Damages Under General
Liability Policies, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 203, 203-04 (1981).
66. Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967).
67. Cf. 13 Cal. 3d at 65, 529 P.2d at 624, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
68. See Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476,490, 31 P.2d 389, 395 (1934). If, however, the defend-
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punishment.69
The requirement of intentional wrongdoing, or at least gross negli-
gence, for an award of punitive damages is also an outgrowth of the
twin rationales of punishment and deterrence.7" The function of tort
law is not to punish unintentional acts.7' The reason actual damages
are awarded in cases of mere negligence is to compensate the injured
plaintiff, not to punish the defendant.72 Punishment is only appropri-
ate when a culpable mental element such as wrongful intent exists.
73
Moreover, the deterrent effect of assessing punitive damages for negli-
gent acts would be dubious. A negligent act is, by definition, unin-
tended.74 An award of punitive damages would have little, if any,
effect in deterring future negligent acts.7 5 The reason for restricting re-
covery of punitive damages to cases involving intentional misconduct is
that these are the only cases in which punitive damages may function
effectively as retribution and as a deterrent.76
The traditional purposes for awarding punitive damages-incentive,
punishment, and deterrence-were developed in actions involving a
single plaintiff and defendant.77 Punitive damages do further these
traditional societal interests when awarded in single party actions.78
The imposition of punitive damages in cases when a defendant has sus-
tained compensatory liability to a large number of individual plaintiffs,
however, may result in a total award which is much larger than neces-
sary to fulfill the traditional purposes of incentive, punishment, and
deterrence. This situation has been referred to as overkill.79 An under-
standing of the concept of overkill and the resulting unfairness to de-
fendants is required to identify the circumstances in which it may
occur.
C The Concept of Overkill
Punitive damages were born of an era unfamiliar with the phenome-
ant dies after ajudgment for punitive damages is entered against him, the right to recover is vested
in the plaintiff. See Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 316, 298 P.2d 667, 673 (1956).
69. If the rationale for awarding punitive damages was actually to compensate the plaintiff,
however, it would be more sensible to allow the right to recover to survive the defendant. Fur-
thermore, the deterrent effect of punitive damages is not decreased by this rule. Few will commit
unlawful acts secure in the knowledge that their estate will not be subject to punitive liability.
70. See generally PROSSER, supra note 38, at 9-10.
71. See J. FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FLEMING].
72. Cf. Fleming, supra note 71, at 2.
73. See generally Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 489-90, 31 P.2d 389, 389-95 (1934).
74. See generally PROSSER, supra note 38, at 250.
75. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 10.
76. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 9.
77. See note I supra.
78. See notes 42-79 and accompanying text supra.
79. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-42 (2d Cir. 1967).
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non of mass liability."0 Only recently have courts begun to recognize
the relationship between punitive damages and mass liability." One of
the few cases to recognize the dangers and difficulties of awarding pu-
nitive damages in mass liability situations was Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. 82 The plaintiff in Roginsky brought an individual action
for damages sustained as a result of taking a drug, MER/29, manufac-
tured by the defendant. 3 The drug was designed to lower blood cho-
lesterol and was marketed nationally.8" As a result of taking the drug,
the plaintiff, and many others, developed cataracts.8" The jury
awarded the plaintiff $17,500 in compensatory damages and $100,000
in punitive damages.86 Roginsky was the first of 75 similar cases
against the same defendant then pending in the southern district of
New York alone.8 7 Several hundred suits had been filed nationally.88
In reversing the award of punitive damages, Judge Friendly observed:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on
the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering .... We have the
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in
such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so admin-
istered as to avoid overkill. 89
Among the problems discussed by the court were: (1) the inequity
of assessing punitive liability in an amount that far exceeds the applica-
ble criminal penalty for the defendant's act;90 (2) the possibility that
the first persons to bring suit will "strip [the] cupboard bare. . ." with
large punitive awards leaving the defendant insolvent and unable to
pay the compensatory damages of subsequent claimants;91 (3) the in-
ability to limit awards of punitive damages in cases which are brought
in different courts;92 (4) the ability of the defendant to pass the cost of
80. See generally id. at 838-42.
81. See generally id. at 838-42.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 834.
84. Id. at 834-35.
85. Id. at 835-36.
86. Id. at 834.
87. Id.
88. Id. Eventually over 1500 suits were filed. For a discussion of the intricacies of this litiga-
tion see Rheingold, The MER/29 Stor- n Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 116, 121 (1968).
89. 378 F.2d at 839.
90. Id. at 839. If all of the plaintiffs suing Richardson-Merrell received punitive damages,
the total award would "run into tens of millions. ... See id. The criminal penalty for the
defendant's action was imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of $10,000 or both.
See id. 21 U.S.C. §333(b) (1976).
91. Id. at 840.
92. The problems described by the court in (2) and (3) may occur in the class action context
when the entire group of injured individuals is not included in the suing class. This exclusion may
be a result of the jurisdictional limits of the particular court. See generally H. NEWBERG, CLASS
ACTIONS, 469-70 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NEWBERO]. Those not included will be forced to
bring their action at another time or place.
1281
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insuring against punitive liability on to the public, in jurisdictions that
allow this type of insurance;93 and (5) the danger that an error as to
one product may end the business life of a defendant who has, in the
past, been of great social value.94 The court held that these dangers
justified subjecting the claim for punitive damages to a higher standard
of proof than the compensatory claim.95 The problems of overkill
identified in Roginsky are ordinarily present any time that a defendant
sustains compensatory and punitive liability to a large number of indi-
vidual plaintiffs. By allowing a large class of plaintiffs to sue a single
defendant in one action, the common question class action device may
exacerbate this type of situation.
Today, certain types of common question class actions serve most of
the societal purposes that punitive damages are designed to serve,
namely those of incentive and deterrence. 96 Awards of punitive dam-
ages have been considered in these types of class actions only because
of a failure to compare the interests that punitive damages were created
to serve and those currently served by the modem class action device.97
To make this comparison, the societal purposes that the class action
currently serves must be identified.
CLASS AcTioNs
Determining whether the purposes of punitive damages are ade-
quately fulfilled by the class action device will involve a critical exami-
nation of the societal purposes that the class action was designed to
fulfill,98 and those that it actually does fulfill.9 9 In addition, the unin-
tended punitive effects of the class action device must be considered.100
The failure to accomplish the purported purposes of the class action is
an appropriate place to begin.
A. Purported Purposes of the Common Question Class Action
In determining what societal purposes the common question class ac-
tion actually serves, it is important to distinguish the justifications for
93. See id. at 841.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 842, 85 1.
96. See notes 125-199 and accompanying text infra.
97. See, ag., Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 477, 629 P.2d 23, 32, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 515, 524 (1981); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 815, 484 P.2d 964, 973, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 805 (1971); Wilson v. Bank of America, No. 643,872 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, 1982) (a
currently pending class action in which the court has proposed to award $47,002,000 in compensa-
tory, and $54,000,000 in punitive damages). See proposed statement of decision supra note 2.
98. See notes 101-121 and accompanying text infra.
99. See notes 122-199 and accompanying text infra.
100. See notes 200-225 and accompanying text infra.
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the device that have little or no basis in reality. Two of the purported
purposes of the common question class action are facilitating the com-
pensation of individual plaintiffs under substantive theories of law, 0 1
and promoting judicial economy."°2 In the sixteen years since the
amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, creating the com-
mon question class action, neither of these rationales has been shown to
be consistent with the use and effects of the device.
1. Compensation
The paramount function of tort law is to afford compensation to the
plaintiff for an injury sustained through the wrongful conduct of an-
other. 0 3 The common question class action is merely a procedural de-
vice for administering the substantive law of torts. Thus, one of the
purposes of the common question class action is to facilitate the com-
pensation of plaintiffs under substantive theories of law for injuries
caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct.1t0 Although most class
actions do facilitate the recovery and distribution of damages, some
class actions obviously do not have compensation of the plaintiffs as
their primary goal. 05 For instance, class actions based on antitrust vio-
lations or actions on behalf of a large class of consumers may involve a
comparatively small amount of actual damage to each member of the
class.10 6 After the costs of administration, notice to class members, at-
torneys' fees, and distribution of the judgment are deducted, the indi-
vidual share of a class member, minute to begin with, may well be
nonexistent. 107 When the class members do receive their shares of the
judgment or settlement, the amount of each share may be so small that
one may well ask whether fulfilling the compensatory goal was worth
101. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text infra.
102. See notes 114-121 and accompanying text in/ra.
103. See FLEMING, supra note 71, at 1; PROSSER, supra note 38, at 6; 47 CAL. JuR. 2d Torts, §2
(1959).
104. See Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 127, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (1981);
Hearings on reform of class action litigation procedures before the Subcommittee on Judicial Aa-
chinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978) (remark of Daniel J.
Meador. "A major flaw in Rule 23(b)(3)... is that it is constructed wholly on a compensatory
premise.").
105. See generally GOULD, supra note 44, at 39-49.
106. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). In
Daar the plaintiff was suing for overcharges made by a taxi company. Although the plaintiff
claimed that he had expended $100, the actual amount of the overcharge was uncertain. Id. at
703, 433 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
107. See American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22-23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
ACTL; GOULD, supra note 44, at 44; Handler, The Shift to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third AnnualAntitrust Review, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Handler].
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the substantial investment in time, effort, and judicial resources. 08
By way of specific example, suppose a taxicab company in a large
metropolitan area unlawfully overcharged its passengers in the amount
of three cents a mile'0 9 over the course of two years." 0 Several million
people become victims of this illegal conduct. While the average indi-
vidual damages are approximately fifty cents, the total amount of
money wrongfully gained by the cab company is roughly $1.5 million.
The goal of a class action brought on behalf of these unfortunate indi-
viduals cannot be to recover and return the fifty cents lost by each or
whatever fraction thereof remains after the various costs of litigation
are deducted. The miniscule individual recovery would certainly not
justify the enormous expenditure in time, effort, expense, and judicial
resources.' Thus, when the amount of individual recovery in a class
action is minute, compensation is not a paramount consideration.' 12 In
these instances, the maintenance of the class suit must be justified by
another rationale.' ' One rationale which merits exploration is the pro-
motion of judicial economy.
2 Judicial Economy
The advisory committee note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), which created the common question class action, states that
the purpose of the provision is to "achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons simi-
larly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about
other undesirable results.""' In fact, the promotion of judicial econ-
omy has been a goal of the class action device since its inception." 5
The effect of Rule 23(b)(3), however, has not been consistent with the
stated goals of economy of time, effort, and expense.
The common question class action has allowed plaintiffs to bring ac-
tions which otherwise would never have been litigated because the po-
108. See ACTL, supra note 107, at 22-23; GOULD, supra note 44, at 44; Handler, srupra note
107, at 9-10.
109. The facts of this example bear some resemblance to Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d
695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
110. The applicable (fictional) statute of limitations.
111. See ACTL, supra note 107, at 22-23; GOULD, supra note 44, at 44; Handler, supra note
107, at 9-10.
112. Thus, it is not surprising to find observations such as "[b]eyond question only lawyers
benefit from such cases." Simon, ClassActions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 376-77 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Simon].
113. See D. JONES & C. WELDON, LAWYERS' READY REFERENcE To CLAss ACTIONS 9
(1972).
114. FED. R. CIw. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee note. The question of whether the rule has
sacrificed procedural fairness or brought about other undesirable results will be discussed infra at
1294.
115. See generally NEWBERG, supra note 92, at 16.
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tential amount of individual recovery was far too small to finance an
individual lawsuit." 6 The common question class action actually in-
creases the workload of the courts by permitting a plaintiff to bring his
cause of action on behalf of all those who have been injured in similar
circumstances and aggregate the damages of the entire class, thereby
rendering the lawsuit economically feasible." 7 Although the plaintiff
will gain no more than his individual damages if the action is success-
ful, the costs of litigation may be deducted from the aggregate recovery
of the class. 18
In the taxicab hypothetical above, none of the individual plaintiffs
would consider individual litigation an economically reasonable means
of redressing their injuries. The miniscule amount of potential recov-
ery would not begin to offset the expenses of litigation. The common
question class action device, however, allows any of them to sue on
behalf of the entire class, thereby making litigation economically feasi-
ble and adding to the already crowded court calendar another case
which, but for the use of the representative suit, would never have
reached the courtroom." 9 A device that encourages lawsuits that
otherwise would not have been initiated, cannot be said to have
achieved economies of time, effort, and expense.'
20
The maintenance of class actions in which the potential individual
recovery is minute cannot be justified under either the compensatory or
judicial economy rationales. Yet, courts continue to certify these types
of classes despite the knowledge that the purported rationales behind
the maintenance of the representative lawsuit break down when ap-
plied to the small individual recovery class action.' 2' To determine
whether the purposes of punitive damages have been adequately served
116. One study, after analyzing all the civil dockets of the United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York from July 1, 1966 to December 1, 1971, found that the number of
class actions instituted in 1971 was almost/our times the number instituted in 1967. The study
also found that of the class actions which were commenced in 1966, more than fifty-three percent
were still pending five years later. The study posited 'Judicial chaos rather than judicial economy
." as the end product of the rule. See ACTL, supra note 107, at III, 13. The procedural
methods used were, in fact, underinclusive. To appear on the docket as a class action, a motion
relating to class action status must have been made. If no motion was made, the class action was
not counted. See ACTL, supra note 107, at 1n, 13.
117. See ACTL, supra note 107, at HI, 13. But see Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969),
which held that separate and distinct claims may not be added together to meet the amount in
controversy requirement in a diversity action.
118. See Handier, supra note 107, at 9-10.
119. See ACTL, supra note 107, at III, 13.
120. See Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class .ctior" An Empirical Study, 62 GEe. L.J 1123, 1130
(1974). This study, which supports the use of the 23(b)(3) class action, found that the increase in
class action filings since 1966 was far greater than the increase in all other civil actions. "In 1972,
when the number of civil actions filed in the District of Columbia decreased by nearly 18 percent,
over the previous year, class action ilings increased by 58 percent .... ." Id.
121. See notes 103-120 and accompanying text supra.
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by the class action device, the actual purposes which the class action
serves must be specifically identified.
B. Actual Purposes
Since it is clear that in some instances the class action device does not
achieve the purported goals of compensating plaintiffs or promoting
judicial economy,122 the question arises: What societal purposes, if
any, does it promote? The answer to this question lies not in the pur-
ported justifications for the device, but in its application to actual liti-
gants in the courtrooms of the country. Two societal purposes that the
class action device is actually serving are: (1) providing an incentive to
plaintiffs to seek judicial redress for their minor injuries, 123 and (2) de-
terring defendants, and others like them, from committing unlawful
acts in the future.124 Not all class actions serve these purposes effec-
tively, however. The ability to determine which types of class actions
do further these societal purposes is required to decide whether a par-
ticular class should be certified for the recovery of punitive damages.
L Incentive
There is substantial authority in the federal system for the proposi-
tion that one of the basic objectives of Rule 23(b)(3) is to provide par-
ties who have small claims with a method of obtaining redress.'25 This
incentive to litigate is of two types: (1) incentive to the individual
plaintiff provided by the ability to redress the violation of a right, and
(2) monetary incentive to the plaintiff's attorney.
As in the case of punitive damages,126 a plaintiff whose potential re-
covery is too small to warrant resort to the courts is provided with an
incentive to litigate. 2 7 The aggregate potential recovery of the class
may then render litigation economically feasible.'28 Although at first
122. See ACTL, supra note 107, at 6.
123. See generally AMERCAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, CON-
SUMER CLASS AcTIONS, 7-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AEI].
124. See generally AEI, supra note 123, at 8-9; GOULD, supra note 44, at 13-34; Homburger,
State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 609 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Homburger]. The incentive and deterrent functions of the common question class action both
stem from the ability to aggregate the damages of the class. Although these purposes are closely
related, for purposes of clarity, they will be discussed separately here. See notes 125-199 and
accompanying text supra.
125. See, eg., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Hohmann
v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1968); Rutherford v. United States, 429 F.
Supp. 506, 508 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Steinmetz v. Bache & Co., 71 F.R..D. 202,205 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484-485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
126. See notes 42-57 and accompanying text supra.
127. See note 125 supra.
128. See 391 F.2d at 560, 563. See generally AEI, supra note 123, at 7-8. This incentive,
however, does not make individual compensation of the plaintiff class feasible. See notes 103-113
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glance the incentive rationale may appear similar to the compensation
rationale,129 there is a distinction. The goal of the compensation ra-
tionale is to allow the wronged individual to recover damages.1 30 Class
actions with small individual recoveries do not further the goal of com-
pensation because the minute amount of individual benefit does not
justify the large expenditure in time, effort, and judicial resources.
13 1
The incentive rationale, on the other hand, is aimed at providing a
plaintiff, whose potential individual recovery is small, with a method of
gaining access to the courts regardless of whether he is adequately com-
pensated.1 32 By allowing the costs of litigation to be imposed on the
potential aggregate damages of the class, the class action device renders
feasible a lawsuit which, if brought on behalf of the plaintiff alone,
would not be economically practicable. The small amount of potential
individual recovery involved in an action brought solely on behalf of
the plaintiff would not be worth the investment in litigation costs. Al-
though the plaintiff may not be compensated for his injury,1 33 the class
action device allows him to bring the defendant before the court and
redress a violation of his rights. The incentive to the plaintiff, then, is
not a matter of economics but one of principle.
The incentive to the plaintiff provided by the common question class
action should be distinguished from that provided by the possibility of
receiving an award of punitive damages. The incentive to the plaintiff
in seeking an award of punitive damages is the result of the practice of
giving the punitive award to the plaintiff.13 1 In other words, the action
is brought because the plaintiff stands to gain a windfall.135 In a suc-
cessful class action, however, the aggregate damages of the plaintiff
class are not awarded to the party who brought the suit. The damages
must be given to the members of the class or be distributed through
some fluid recovery mechanism.1 36 Thus, the incentive to bring a class
action in which the potential individual recovery is small emanates not
from the individual benefit to be gained, but from the ability to redress
the violation of a right. The injured plaintiffs opportunity to partici-
pate in the deterrent function of the modem class action 37 also con-
tributes to this incentive.
and accompanying text supra. As discussed above, compensation is not a viable goal of the small
individual recovery class action. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 103-104 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
132. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 103-113 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 57 supra.
135. See note 57 supra.
136. See notes 178-182 and accompanying text infra.
137. See notes 154-199 and accompanying text infra.
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The incentive function of the class action furthers the public policy
of encouraging the enforcement of rights. The class action, in this con-
text, has been designated a "'semi-public remedy administered by the
lawyer in private practice'-a cross between administrative action and
private litigation."' 13 The plaintiff who brings an action to enforce the
rights of a class is acting in the capacity of a private attorney general. 139
The plaintiffs ability to redress a violation of his rights is not the
only existing incentive to bring a class action when individual litigation
is impractical. The attorneys who bring class actions have a distinct
monetary interest in their maintenance and proliferation.140 Attorneys'
fees in large class actions may be quite substantial. 4' Some critics of
the class action device have claimed that lawyers, attracted by the pos-
sibility of a contingent fee assessed against the aggregate damages of
the entire class, have initiated meritless class action claims. 142 Regard-
less of the validity of these criticisms, in the past lawyers have not been
hestitant to file class actions suits, 143 nor are they likely to be in the
future.
In addition, the holding of the Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co. , 4 allowing recovery of attorneys' fees in certain class
actions, offers a further incentive to the plaintiff and his attorney to
seek judicial enforcement of violated rights. "4s In Mills, the Court rec-
ognized an exception to the general American rule barring recovery of
attorneys' fees and allowed the plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees when
he successfully maintained a class suit that benefited a group of others
in the same manner as himself.146 The practice of awarding attorneys'
fees in class actions will increase the benefit to the individual class
members 47 and to the plaintiffs counsel.' 48 Thus, the possibility of
138. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting Kalven & Rosenfield,
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHi. L. REv. 684, 717 (1941)).
139. See Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America, 23
BUFFALO L. REv. 343, 345 (1973).
Class actions are but a logical extension of the notion that self-interest normally may
be relied upon to develop the truth in an adversarial context. We may trust a man to
help his fellow men if, by helping them, he helps himself.
See id, at 345; see also GOULD, supra note 44, at 18-19.
140. See 43 F.R.D. at 494-95. See generally ACTL, supra note 107, at 36.
141. See, eg., Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 481 F.2d 1045, 1052-53 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 ($1,960,000); In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 420 F.
Supp. 610, 638-40 (D. Colo. 1976) ($2,656,401.26).
142. See ACTL, supra note 107, at 36. See generally Homburger, supra note 124, at 650-51.
See notes 220-222 and accompanying text infra.
143. See ACTL, supra note 107, at II, 13.
144. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
145. See id. at 392.
146. See id. at 391-92.
147. Attorneys' fees will not be deducted from the recovered damages, allowing individual
plaintiffs to take a greater share.
148. Plaintiffs counsel will not have to run the risk of a judgment that is less than the amount
of attorneys' fees.
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recovering attorneys' fees will increase the incentive to bring a class
action in circumstances when the potential individual recovery is
minimal.
Ironically, the plaintiffs ability to aggregate the damages of the class,
which has precluded the common question class action from fulfilling
its goals of facilitating compensation and promoting judicial econ-
omy,'149 has allowed the class action to fulfill an entirely different socie-
tal purpose. By giving the plaintiff the ability to aggregate the damages
of the class and thus finance litigation which otherwise would be im-
practicable, the class action acts as an incentive to seek judicial redress
when only small individual recoveries are possible. By providing the
individual plaintiff with an opportunity for recourse to the courts for
infringements that would warrant only a minimal amount of damages,
the class action device assumes a role similar to the incentive function
of punitive damages.150 Diminutive invasions of rights, perpetrated
upon large numbers of people, no longer need go unanswered.
The incentive function does not exist in all common question class
actions. In many class actions the potential individual recoveries of the
plaintiff class are large enough to warrant individual litigation.15 1 In
these cases, the class action device is used to achieve the intended goals
of compensation and judicial economy. 152 The distinguishing features
of class actions in which the compensation and judicial economy ratio-
nales fail and the incentive rationale succeeds are: (1) an amount of
potential individual recovery too insignificant to warrant individual
litigation, 53 and (2) an aggregate amount of potential recovery that is
sufficient to finance the lawsuit. Courts should consider whether the
incentive purpose of punitive damages is fulfilled by the class action
device prior to certifying a class for the recovery of punitive damages.
Another factor that should be considered is whether the specific class
action effectively serves the deterrent function of punitive damages.
149. See notes 103-124 and accompanying text supra.
150. Compare notes 42-57 and accompanying text supra with notes 125-149 and accompanying
text supra.
151. For example, in the Dalkon Shield litigation, the average individual damages were in
excess of $300,000. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F.
Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
152. See notes 101-124 and accompanying text supra.
153. This will be a difficult standard to set and will probably have to be determined on a case
by case basis. One possible standard is set forth in the Kennedy Bill, which was introduced in
1978 in the Senate but was never enacted into law. The bill proposed to create a "civil public
action for redress of small monetary injuries to numerous members of the public." The relevant
standards were: "(1) such conduct injures two hundred or more named or unnamed persons, each
in an amount not exceeding $300.00; (2) the combined amount of the injury to such persons ex-
ceeds $60,000 .. " See S. 3475, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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2. Deterrence
Closely related to the incentive function of the common question
class action is its role in modem society as a deterrent. 154 This function
is apparent in the field of consumer class actions. 55 The California
Supreme Court said in Vasquez v. Superior Court:156  "Protection of
unwary consumers from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exi-
gency of the utmost priority."157 Contemporary mass marketing tech-
niques facilitate price fixing and other consumer abuses.'5 8
Manufacturers are able to increase their profits by unlawfully depriving
large numbers of consumers of relatively small amounts of money.1 "9
Since individual litigation is not an economically feasible method of
redressing this type of activity, the wrongdoer or prospective wrongdo-
ers are not deterred.' 60 The individual consumer's potential recovery is
usually far too small to justify the substantial expenditures involved in
conducting a lawsuit. 61 Criminal sanctions have also proved to be im-
potent in deterring this type of activity. 62 Fines that are dwarfed by
the advertising budgets of the defendants against whom they are im-
posed cannot hope to be an effective deterrent.163 The possiblity of ac-
tual incarceration of defendants convicted of antitrust violations is
practically nil.' 4
154. See generally AEI, supra note 123, at 8-9; GOULD, supra note 44, at 13-34.
155. See generally GOULD, supra note 44, at 13-34; Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092, and S. 3201
before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
(1969-1970).
156. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
157. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
158. Seegenerally Nader & Green, Crime in the Suites, THE NEw REPUBLIC, April 29, 1972, at
36 [hereinafter cited as Nader & Green]. A 1961 survey asked businessmen: In your industry, are
there any accepted business practices which you regard as unethical? Four-fifths responded m the
affirmative. See Nader & Green, supra, at 35.
159. For example, in 1964, the average American consumer could buy a loaf of bread for
about twenty cents, while in Seattle, the price was about twenty-four cents. This twenty percent
difference was caused by a local price-fixing conspiracy. The amount that the Seattle consumers
were overcharged was in the neighborhood of $35 million. See Nader & Green, supra note 158, at
35.
160. See notes 127-128 and accompanying text supra.
161. See Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 123, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343 (1981).
This case involved a price-fixing conspiracy in which approximately 1.5 million people were
wrongly deprived of $125 each. For a discussion of the relationship between the amount of poten-
tial recovery and the decision to seek judicial redress, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 162 (1974).
162. See Nader & Green, supra note 158, at 35.
163. The maximum fine for a violation of the Sherman Act was raised in 1977 from $50,000 to
$1,000,000. 15 U.S.C. §1 (Supp. I 1977). Compare this to Procter & Gamble's 1972 Advertising
Budget of $230 million. See Nader & Green, supra note 158, at 35. See also DuVal, The Class
Action as anAntitrust Enforcement Device" The Chicago Experience, 1979 Amer. Bar. Foundation
Res. J. 1023, 1025 n.9 [hereinafter cited as Duval].
164. In the entire history of the Sherman Act, only three businessmen have gone to jail. One
possible explanation for this phenomenon is the reluctance of judges and juries to send white
collar criminals to jail. See Nader & Green, supra note 158, at 35. See also Posner, 4 Statistical
Study ofAntitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 365, 388-91 (1970).
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The class action device, however, provides the individual consumer
with what may be the only viable method of deterring large corporate
manufacturers from taking unfair advantages in the marketplace.' 65
By aggregating the damages of the entire class, a lawsuit in which the
plaintiff's potential individual recovery is inconsequential can nonethe-
less be rendered economically feasible.' 66 If the action is successful, the
defendant is deterred from future transgressions by being forced to dis-
gorge his ill-gotten gains. In addition, all others who would be prone to
commit the type of activity which caused the suit are deterred by the
threat of a similar lawsuit. Furthermore, the therapeutic effect is en-
hanced by the social stigma attached to the defendant's status in a class
action.167 The publicity inherent in a large class action may be severely
detrimental to the business relationships of a corporate or private de-
fendant.'68 The loss of revenues caused by damage to the defendant's
business reputation 69 will further deter him and others from engaging
in unlawful behavior.
Under a deterrent rationale, the primary focus is upon confiscation
from the defendant of any wrongfully gained monies. 170 The identity
of the receipient of this money, once confiscated, is irrelevant.' 7' Just
as in the case of punitive damages, 172 the societal purpose of deterring
the defendant and making an example of him is effectuated merely by
depriving him of his ill-gotten gains. Class actions that deprive the de-
fendant of unlawfully gained money further this deterrent purpose de-
spite the fact that they fail altogether to advance their intended
purposes of compensation and promotion of judicial economy.171
Another area of law in which the in terrorrem 174 rationale of class
actions has become prevalent is securities regulation. 175 Similar to con-
sumer class actions, the potential individual recovery in these cases is
likely to be insufficient to warrant litigation. 176 The class action device,
165. One writer has even gone as far as to suggest that the main purpose of the consumer class
action should be to act as a deterrent against mass consumer abuses. See GOULD, supra note 44,
at 34. Contra, ACTL, Mpra note 107, at 21; Handler, supra note 107, at 9; Simon, upra note 112,
at 375.
166. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text supra.
167. Loss of goodwill due to stigmatization is discussed at notes 203-207 and accompanying
text infra.
168. See generally notes 203-207 and accompanying text infra.
169. See generally notes 203-207 and accompanying text infra.
170. See GOULD, supra note 44, at 21.
171. See GOULD, supra note 44, at 21.
172. See notes 58-79 and accompanying text supra.
173. See notes 103-121 and accompanying text supra.
174. "In fright or alarm or terror. In terror or warning; by way of threat...." BLACKs LAW
DICTIONARY, 735 (5th ed. 1979).
175. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
176. See, e.g., 417 U.S. at 164; 43 F.R.D. at 485.
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however, provides an effective means of deterring defendants and
others like them from engaging in proscribed behavior by enhancing
the threat of public exposure and compensatory civil liability to a large
group of plaintiffs.
177
One relatively recent innovation supporting the deterrent function of
class actions is the increasing use of fluid recovery. 178 Fluid recovery is
a method of distributing the award that is used when the identities of
the members of the plaintiff class cannot be ascertained.179 The award
is most commonly distributed to a class which resembles in some man-
ner the class of plaintiffs.1 80 The primary goal of fluid recovery is to
separate the defendant from the money he wrongfully acquired. 81 Re-
turning the award to the actual injured party is of lesser, if any, impor-
tance.182 . The use of fluid recovery is indicative of society's
abandonment of the compensatory purpose of class actions and the
adoption of the class action device as a means of deterring unlawful
conduct. Neither the compensation nor the judicial economy rationale
can support maintaining a lawsuit on behalf of a class of unknown
plaintiffs and distributing the award to a class which, although admit-
tedly similar, may be entirely distinct. 8 3
A class action will not perform as a deterrent to wrongful behavior
unless the amount of potential aggregate recovery is large in relation to
the defendant's net assets. 84 A wealthy defendant will not be deterred
by a small amount of potential compensatory liability. 85 Some
wealthy defendants may be able to include small amounts of compen-
satory civil liability in the everyday costs of doing business. Thus,
cases in which the amount of aggregate compensatory recovery liability
is small will not serve the deterrent purpose of punitive damages suffi-
ciently to invalidate a punitive award.186 Determining whether the par-
ticular defendant is actually going to be deterred from engaging in
177. See 43 F.R.D. at 487; Duval, supra note 163, at 1346-49. The therapeutic effect of class
actions brought under securities regulations has been analogized to that of a stockholder's deriva-
tive suit. See 43 F.R.D. at 487.
178. See, e.g., Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324,325-26 (N.D. Ill. 1972); 52 F.R.D.
at 264. See generaly Note, An Economic Analysis ofluid Recovery Mechanisms, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 173, 185 (1981).
179. See NEWBERG, supra note 92, at 1425; Duval, supra note 163, at 1329-30.
180. See NEWBERG, supra note 92, at 1425. See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of Fluid
Recovery Mechanisms, 34 STAN. L. REV. 173.
181. See NEWBERG, supra note 92, at 1425.
182. See NEWBERG, supra note 92, at 1425.
183. See generally notes 103-121 and accompanying text supra.
184. Cf. MacDonald v. Joslyn, 275 Cal. App. 2d 282, 293-94, 79 Cal. Rptr. 707, 713-14 (1969)
(setting forth a similar principle while upholding an award of punitive damages). See notes 62-64
and accompanying text supra.
185. Cf. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 293-94, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
186. C/id.
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lawless behavior requires a balancing of. (1) the size of the potential
aggregate recovery of the class, and (2) the net worth of the defendant.
Many common question class actions are not motivated by a desire
to compensate the injured parties, or to promote judicial economy.
Class actions in which the potential individual recovery is large are
being used by courts to provide plaintiffs with an incentive to litigate
and to deter defendants from engaging in wrongful conduct. An exam-
ple of the practical application of the incentive and deterrent functions
of the common question class action may be helpful at this point.
3. Application of the Incentive and Deterrent Functions
A brief discussion of the facts of Dolgow v. Anderson187 will help to
illustrate both the incentive and deterrent functions of the modem class
action device and the manner in which they interact. In Dolgow, the
plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all 100,000 purchasers of
Monsanto stock.18 8 The plaintiffs contended that the defendants had
unlawfully manipulated the price of Monsanto stock to their own bene-
fit. 189 The defendants also allegedly concealed information that would
have indicated that Monsanto was in fact experiencing financial diffi-
culty.190 The damages to individual defendants were, for the most part,
miniscule. 191 The court noted that were it not for the ability to aggre-
gate the potential recovery of the class provided by the class action
device, the plaintiffs would have been effectively precluded from, pursu-
ing their claims. 92 In addition, the court discussed the incentive to the
attorney in bringing the action:
In some areas of the law, society is dependent upon the "initiative of
lawyers for the assertion of rights. . ." and the maintenance of de-
sired standards of conduct. The prospect of handsome compensation
is held out as an inducement to encourage lawyers to bring such
suits.
19 3
The Dolgow case is, therefore, one example of the way in which a class
action may serve as an incentive both to the plaintiff and his attorney to
litigate a small claim. By allowing the plaintiff to spread the costs of
litigation over the aggregate damages of the class, the action is ren-
dered economically feasible. In addition, "[t]he prospect of handsome
187. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
188. Id. at 475.
189. Id. at 479.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 494.
192. Id. at 494-95.
193. Id., (quoting Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
deniedsub. nom., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1965)).
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compensation" to the attorney bringing the suit creates a powerful in-
centive to litigate.
Finally, the court discussed the therapeutic value of the class ac-
tion.'94 Without the benefit of the class action device, the unlawful ac-
tivity of the defendants would have been allowed to continue
unchecked. 195 Thus, the litigation made possible by the use of the class
action device may provide the only potent deterrent against this type of
antisocial conduct. Moreover, the threat of a class action acts as a de-
terrent to those who would imitate the acts of the defendant. 196
The class action device has, in some instances, forsaken the goals of
compensation and judicial economy and assumed a role not intended
by its creators. 197 Through the incentive and deterrent functions, the
class action has shed the cocoon of a mere procedural device and has
become the protector of the little man. The message of Rule 23(b)(3) is
clear: no longer are the masses an easy mark for those who would
wrongfully deprive them of a few cents each, in the hopes that these
insignificant individual injuries will not warrant redress. The class ac-
tion has given the individual plaintiff the incentive to act as a private
attorney general, performing a function normally reserved to govern-
mental bodies, namely that of deterring wrongdoers from engaging in
unlawful conduct.' 98 In many cases the common question class action
performs precisely the same incentive and deterrent functions that the
possibility of punitive liability does in single plaintiff suits.199
At this point, the rationales behind awarding punitive damages and
the common question class action diverge. Although both may serve
the interests of society by providing plaintiffs with an incentive to liti-
gate and deterring unlawful conduct, only punitive damages are in-
tended as punishment. In certain circumstances, however, the class
action device may have effects that, although not intended to be retrib-
utive, are, in fact, punitive in character.
PUNITIVE EFFECTS OF A CLASS ACTION
The purpose of a representative suit does not include punishing the
defendant."° Critics of the class action have maintained, however, that
194. 43 F.R.D. at 487-88.
195. Id. at 486.
196. See notes 154-186 and accompanying text supra.
197. See notes 125-196 and accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 154-186 and accompanying text supra.
199. Compare notes 122-196 and accompanying text supra with notes 38-79 and accompanying
text supra.
200. With the exception of the imposition of punitive damages, the concept of retribution is
absent in tort law. See PROSSER, supra note 38, at 6-7; CAL. JuR. 2d Torts §2; Wright, Introduction
to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 238 (1944).
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the device may have substantial punitive effects on defendants. 201 Al-
though the class action is a procedural device, many of its effects are
more closely akin to criminal sanctions than to civil remedies. One
example of these punitive effects may be found in the pressure brought
to bear on a defendant to settle out of court because of: (1) the poten-
tial damage to the defendant's reputation caused by the amount of ad-
verse publicity inherent in some class actions; (2) the extremely high
cost and difficulty in managing the defense of a class action; and
(3) the potential for a large adverse judgment should the defendant not
prevail at trial.
20 2
Respectable, well-known companies can be severely damaged by bad
publicity.2 "3 Loss of goodwill among business associates, as well as
among the public, can be the consequence of a detrimental change in
the image a business puts forth.2°4 The mere filing of a large class ac-
tion can damage the reputation of a well-known company.205 The pos-
sibility of lost business due to the large amount of adverse publicity
inherent in many class actions puts tremendous pressure on a defend-
ant to settle regardless of whether a settlement is warranted on the mer-
its. 206 The amount of a substantial settlement may still be less than the
revenues which would be lost because of bad publicity. 2 7 Additional
pressure to settle arises from the cost of defending against a large class
action.20 8 The expense of this variety of litigation is beyond the means
of most small defendants.2 9 Even large defendants may decide that
the expense of providing a defense and the loss of executive time is
more costly than a settlement agreement.21 0 Furthermore, the size of
the final award, should the defendant decide to go to court and be
found liable, may be so large as to force a defendant to actively pursue
settlement negotiations no matter what the equities of the situation sug-
gest.21 Even a slight chance of incurring compensatory civil liability to
millions of individual plaintiffs is far too dangerous a risk for the aver-
201. Seegenerally AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21; Handler, supra note 107, at 8-9; Simon, supra
note 112, at 388-90.
202. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21. But see DuVal, supra note 163, at 1344-46 (in this
study of antitrust class actions, no significant pressure to settle was found prior to trial).
203. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21.
204. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21.
205. See AEl, supra note 123, at 19-21.
206. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21.
207. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21.
208. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21; GOULD, supra note 44, at 284-306.
209. See AEI, supra note 123, at 19-21.
210. See GOULD, supra note 44, at 287, in which the author quotes from a confidential letter
from a business executive:
Our decision to settle was dictated by the inordinate expense to us for attorney's [sic] fees
and in the loss of executive time and not because we believe any damage was done to the
plaintiffs or to persons similarly situated.
211. See AEL supra note 123, at 19-21.
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age defendant to take, given other available alternatives.212
Although a certain amount of pressure to settle prior to trial is inher-
ent in all lawsuits, the amount of potential compensatory civil liability
in a large class action, in conjunction with the direct and indirect disad-
vantages of litigation, often renders pretrial settlement the only eco-
nomically practicable alternative.213 After an evaluation of the loss of
business likely to ensue because of damage to the defendant's reputa-
tion, the high cost of presenting a defense to a representative suit, and
the enormous potential liability facing a class action defendant, it is not
surprising to find that the vast majority of large class actions never re-
ceive a trial on the merits.214 Courts often augment this pressure by
certifying inherently unmanageable classes, relying on the probability
of pretrial settlement to keep from clogging the courts.21 5 The immense
pressure on a defendant to forgo the right to trial and settle out of court
has led one writer to remark that the class action device is no longer "a
rule of procedure-it is a form of legalized blackmail. 2 1 6 This inher-
ent pressure to settle represents an unbridled form of trial by filing.2 17
Once the plaintiff has commenced a large class action, the defendant
may have no choice other than to purchase peace as cheaply as possi-
ble.21  A procedure, the end result of which is the de facto deprivation
of the defendant's right to trial, functions more as a punishment to the
defendant than as a rule of procedural convenience.21 9
212. For example, the settlement offer accepted by 43 states in the antibiotic antitrust actions
was in the amount of $85 million. See T. BARTSH, F. BoDDY, B. KING & P. THOMPSON, A CLAss
AcTION Surr THAT WORKED 6 (1978).
213. See Simon, supra note 112, at 390. Some may argue that the question of whether puni-
tive damages should be awarded is unimportant since the vast majority of large class actions settle
prior to trial By certifying a class for the recovery of punitive damages, however, a court may
geometrically increase the amount for which a defendant may settle since settlement negotiations
may be based on potential liability at trial.
214. See Simon, supra note 112, at 390.
215. See generally GOULD, supra note 44, at 285; Handler, supra note 107, at 388-90. This
judicial preference for out of court settlement has even achieved the status of legislative intent.
See Handler, supra note 107, at 8 n.42.
216. See Handler, supra note 107, at 8.
217. Cf. Handler, supra note 107, at 9:
Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and
expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it is a form of legal-
ized blackmail.' If defendants who maintain their innocence have no practical alterna-
tive but to settle, they have been de facto deprived of their constitutional right to a trial
on the merits. The distinctions between innocent and guilty d..fendants and between
those who have done little if any harm become blurred, if not invisible. The only signifi-
cant issue becomes the size of the ransom to be paid for total peace.
218. The role of the judiciary in this form of justice is minimal. Although Rule 23(b)(3) re-'
quires the approval of the court prior to any compromise of a class action, see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e), the additional requirement of notice of the compromise to all members of the class, see Id.,
indicates that the judicial focus is upon the rights of the plaintiff class and not upon the fairness of
the settlement to the defendant.
219. See Handler, supra note 107, at 8-10.
In the nearly half century of my practice, I have never seen a single other circumstance
which has created the cynicism at the bar that has arisen from the settlement negotiations
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Critics of the class action have claimed that because of the immense
pressure on a defendant to settle out of court, the device is subject to
abuse by plaintiffs.22 Unscrupulous individuals may file meritless
strike221 or harassment 222 suits. 223 The defendant is then placed in the
unenviable position of having to decide whether to expend large sums
to prevail at trial, or to settle for some lesser amount. Only a highly
principled defendant, indeed, would choose to suffer the larger eco-
nomic blow required to clear his name, rather than forgo trial and
quietly settle out of court.
In addition to increasing the pressure on a defendant to settle out of
court, the size of the defendant's liability may be so large as to assume
punitive characteristics. This liability may take the form of an adverse
judgment at trial or a settlement based on potential liability at trial. In
either case, when a large class of plaintiffs suffers even minor economic
injury, the amount of compensatory liability can be staggering.224 Un-
deniably, this liability represents no more than the amount of the injury
caused by the defendant. A defendant faced with enormous compensa-
tory potential liability, however, cannot help but feel punished. In this
situation, the retributive societal purpose of awarding punitive dam-
ages may be adequately served by the effects of the class action device.
Plaintiffs may argue that the class action device cannot be punitive
because punishment requires a punitive intent. Punitive intent is not,
however, required for the existence of a punitive effect that would ade-
quately serve the retributive purpose of punitive damages. Both the de
facto deprivation of the right to trial and the enormity of the amount of
potential liability, when present, are the unintended punitive effects of
in these cases and the accompanying maneuvering for fees. Nor have I ever seen any-
thing equal to the consternation of unbelieving businessmen, large and small, when told
that the law literally does not provide them with a process for determining the merits of
their defense; that any settlement within their purse, as a practical matter, may be their
only chance for survival.
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Away?, address delivered at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(April 7-9, 1976). The address appears in full at 35 F.R.D. 273.
220. "Actions may be based more upon the defendant's ability to answer a money judgment
than upon the seriousness of any offense." Remark of Senator Marlow W. Cook, Republican of
Kentucky, quoted in AEI, supra note 123, at 19.
221. "A strike suit is ameriless suit brought by a plaintiff merely to coerce a quick and gener-
ous pay-off from a defendant who, does not want to contest even the meritless suit." GOULD,
supra note 44, at 286.
222. A harassing suit, unlike a strike suit, is not filed with personal compensation in mind,
though it too is usually without merit. A harassing suit is usually fied to 'get' someone,
to bring adverse publicity to the defendant (or favorable publicity to the plaintiff), to
attack the 'big boys,' to get media coverage for some point, etc .....
GOULD, supra note 44, at 298.
223. See GOULD, supra note 44, at 284-306.
224. For example, the bread price fixing conspiracy mentioned in note 159 supra. The indi-
vidual consumers were overcharged four cents per loaf of bread. The total amount of damages
was in the neighborhood of $35 million. See note 159 supra.
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an otherwise nonpunitive device. 2" When these circumstances are
present, they may serve to fulfill the societal purpose of punishing the
defendant for his behavior. Prior to certifying a class for the recovery
of punitive damages, the presence or absence of these punitive effects
should be considered.
When the purposes and effects of the common question class action
device amount to a virtual duplication of the purposes of punitive dam-
ages, the resulting redundancy may cause an award of punitive dam-
ages to be unnecessary. This is not to say, however, that the defendant
is to be relieved of the retributive factor inherent in an award of puni-
tive damages nor is society to be deprived of the deterrent effect that
punitive damages has upon those who would otherwise commit antiso-
cial acts. Neither is the individual plaintiff, with an injury so small that
it renders litigation economically infeasible, to be denied an incentive
to seek judicial redress. The common question class action device itself
can, in many instances, adequately serve these interests. In class ac-
tions that do promote these interests, the burden visited upon the de-
fendant in the form of an unwarranted and unnecessary award of
punitive damages, is not justified by the corresponding societal interests
of incentive, punishment, and deterrence. For these reasons, punitive
damages should not be awarded when the purposes behind the award
have already been fulfilled.
CONCLUSION
The modem common question class action has much in common
with the practice of awarding punitive damages. Both function to pro-
vide an incentive to seek judicial redress in situations when the plain-
tiff's potential recovery would not justify litigation. In a single plaintiff
action the possibility of punitive damages in excess of the amount nec-
essary to compensate the plaintiff for the sustained injury provides the
incentive to litigate. Similarly, the method by which the plaintiff is en-
couraged to litigate in the class action device is the ability to aggregate
the damages of the entire class. In addition, the plaintiff's attorney is
given an incentive by the prospect of a handsome fee if successful.
Both methods may render feasible an otherwise economically impracti-
cable lawsuit.
Both the class action device and the assessment of punitive damages
serve a deterrent purpose. Punitive damages have been used to deter
both the defendant and others from the commission of antisocial acts
such as those involving oppression, malice, fraud, or gross negligence.
225. See notes 200-224 and accompanying text supra.
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The in terrorrem effect of the class action device, however, has not been
limited to such exceptional conduct. The common question class ac-
tion has operated to deter defendants and others from virtually any
antisocial behavior for which a large representative suit may be
brought. The combination of the incentive and deterrent effects has
transformed the plaintiff who brings a class action into a private attor-
ney general. The device has allowed a single plaintiff, by suing on be-
half of a class, to redress minor violations of the rights of the public at
large, rights that would otherwise be left defenseless.
On the issue of retribution, the rationales behind class actions and
punitive damages diverge. The effects, however, do not. The rationale
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his act. The class
action, on the other hand, was not designed as a retributive measure.
Some of the effects on defendants in large class actions, however, have
been so severe as to border on punishment. Two of these effects are:
(1) the tremendous pressure on defendants to settle prior to trial be-
cause of adverse publicity, high cost of litigation, and fear of potential
liability; and (2) the huge amounts of compensatory liability to which a
large class action may subject a defendant. A defendant who is subject
to these rigors may be justified in claiming that the class action device
has substantial punitive effects upon those against whom they are filed.
When the defendant feels he has been punished, the retributive societal
purpose of punitive damages has been served.
Not all class actions share these similarities in purpose and effect
with the assessment of punitive damages. Therefore, prior to certifying
a class action for the recovery of punitive damages, a court should con-
sider the societal purposes that punitive damages were designed to pro-
mote, the purposes and effects of the modem common question class
action device, and the purposes that will inhere to the particular class
action in question. The purposes of punitive damages are sufficiently
served by the class action device itself when:
(1) The amount of individual compensatory recovery is insuffi-
cient to warrant litigation by the injured party alone and the aggre-
gate potential damages are sufficient to finance the lawsuit;
226
(2) The amount of aggregate compensatory recovery is large in
relation to the net worth of the defendant; 227 and
(3) Some retributive effects upon the defendant exist, such as
pressure to settle without trial due to adverse publicity, cost of de-
226. These circumstances effectuate the purpose of providing an incentive to litigate to plain-
tiffs with small claims. See notes 125-153 and accompanying text supra.
227. A large amount of aggregate recovery will further the societal purpose of deterring the
defendant and others from similar conduct in the future. See notes 154-186 and accompanying
text supra.
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fending against a class action, or fear of a massive judgment; or the
imposition of an enormous amount of compensatory liability in the
form of judgment at trial or pretrial settlement.228
When all of the above factors are present, the assessment of punitive
damages in a common question class action, in addition to the defend-
ant's compensatory liability, is an unnecessary and unwarranted meas-
ure from which society derives no benefit. The presence or absence of
these factors should therefore be considered by a court prior to certify-
ing any class for the recovery of punitive damages.
Mark Donald Peters
1300
228. These punitive effects will serve the retributive societal purpose. See notes 200-225 and
accompanying text supra.
